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I. LIBERTY AND ITS WORTH 
So long as society is regarded as founded upon agreements, egalitarian 
economic doctrines tend to appear unjust. The price of each person's con- 
sent is fair compensation for his contribution, and a greater contribution 
warrants greater compensation. Even the equal exertion of unequal talents 
and capacities should mean greater rewards for the more gifted. Within 
such a framework the problem of social justice is largely one of determin- 
ing institutional structures in which benefits received adequately repay ben- 
efits conferred, and these structures are subject only to the constraint that 
the liberty which provides the context of consent should not be unneces- 
sarily infringed. For the spectrum of laissez-faire philosophies which consti- 
tute classical liberalism the problem is relatively trivial: Compensation for 
effort is adequate, and the distribution of social goods equitable, as long as 
each person is free to seek his own gain in his own way. The distribution 
will not, of course, be equal, but since equity and equality are distinct, the 
interests of justice are served by guaranteeing liberty alone. Insofar as the 
problem of justice is conceived in terms of a reconciliation between liberty 
and equality, indeed, the expression "social justice" is on this view a misno- 
mer. Social policies which ignore the incompatibility of liberty and equality 
are oppressive and thus inherently unjust. 
There is, of course, a kind of equality which all champions of liberty 
defend. The established human rights and civil liberties, such as equality 
before the law and the equal liberties of citizenship, represent clear cases 
for which there is no conflict between freedom and equality. But such 
equalities can be construed in an entirely formal way and may thus lack any 
relationship to the actual welfare of persons. Equality so understood is 
entirely compatible with the bleak view of human relationships suggested 
by the classical view of liberty, and the conflicts in question arise primarily 
when equality is understood in a distributive or material rather than juristic 
or nominal sense. Within the latter rubric, two egalitarian reactions to 
laissez faire can be distinguished-one still recognizably liberal, one social- 
ist. 
1 
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The first approach retains the framework of free individual choice 
while arguing that within a system of cooperation rational men will recog- 
nize a universal right not only to liberty but also to substantial social goods. 
Especially when the ancient notion of giving every man his due is under- 
stood in the light of the complex interdependencies of modern social orga- 
nization, it seems imperative to devise principles of distribution which are 
distinct from, but compatible with, the claims of individual liberty. The 
problem of finding an agreeable conception of justice which combines 
distinct notions of liberty and equality-so formidable from the perspective 
of classical liberalism is solved in outline by reinterpreting the classical 
view. All liberal individualists suppose that the political and economic 
sectors of society can be distinguished and that each person's welfare is best 
served by maximizing political freedoms while tolerating expedient eco- 
nomic disparities. By assigning all questions of liberty to the political 
sphere and all questions of distribution to the economic, egalitarian liberals 
can maintain that manipulations of the economic sector need constitute no 
significant infringements of liberty. Justice, therefore, does not preclude 
and may demand deliberate efforts to reduce or eliminate economic differ- 
ences and other disadvantages related to them. 
Socialism rejects the liberal problem of social justice by rejecting the 
conception of society from which it arises. If agreement is not the cement 
of society, then the problem of a fair distribution is not rightly posed as 
requiring some accommodation of fairness with liberty. If societies are not 
properly conceived on the model of a hypothetical agreement or tacit con- 
sent, moreover, there is no particular plausibility to the idea of free choice 
independent of social conditions. Nor, therefore, is it appropriate to distin- 
guish a sphere of liberty from a sphere of equality and inequality. On the 
contrary, it will seem evident that political and economic phenomena inter- 
act so strongly that liberties suffer whenever there are substantial differ- 
ences of wealth. Socialism replies to liberalism, in short, that liberty and 
equality are indistinguishable. Both the classical view that they are antagon- 
istic and the modern view that they are reconcilable are wrong. Socialists 
need not value liberty any less than do those who arrogate its banner, but 
they insist that without equality there can be no genuine liberty and justice 
for all. Such equality cannot, of course, be strict if each is to receive goods 
according to his need. Nor can it be effected simply through redistribution. 
The conditions of equality include profound social changes and, in particu- 
lar, change in the nature of work. Only when work constitutes meaningful 
and satisfying activity for everyone will each have a reason to work which 
does not involve the divisive demand for compensation in proportion to 
contribution. 
There is a conception of work which models it on the notion of 
strategic or instrumental rationality central to the liberal tradition. It is 
something that we do in order to achieve ends independent from it. Work 
is the means necessary for obtaining whatever we really want, and working 
hours have a tendency to become time out of life the time spent in order 
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to have the enjoyments that make life worth living or at least to secure the 
subsistence which makes life possible. So conceived, the primary value of 
work for a person, and its primary motivation, is the return on one's labor, 
and one has reason to work only so long as it is necessary to satisfy one's 
desires. On such a view the alienation decried by young Marx is hardly 
more than a formal property of rational action. If, however, work is regard- 
ed not as a means to some other end but as an end in itself, one arrives at 
a different conclusion. Work is then in each person's interest it is each 
person's interest and there is reason to do it independent of how well it 
pays. From this point of view, labor which lacks inherent satisfacitons 
seems oppressive and thus not an activity of free men. Whereas the view of 
work as primarily instrumental represents it as a necessary condition of free 
action, the alternative view warns that such work tends to be meaningless 
labor, legitimate grounds for resentment, and an imposition of unjust insti- 
tutions. Justice clearly requires that the character of work match the second 
conception if the first represents oppressive and unfree activity; but where 
resentment at the nature of one's work cannot be shown to be legitimate 
the first conception is sufficient. Since resentment is a moral attitude, the 
answer to this question depends upon a view about how attitudes are prop- 
erly assessed. 
John Rawls observes that "a theory of justice is . . . a theory of the 
moral sentiments,"1 and it is to be expected that views which differ as 
profoundly as liberalism and socialism will tend to have theories about 
moral sentiments which differ in ways corresponding to their respective 
views of man's relationship with society. Such differences need not be 
immediately apparent, since so far as social ideals are concerned it may be 
difficult to distinguish the two political theories. Rawls's liberalism incor- 
porates a decided tendency to equality and contemplates the social owner- 
ship of means of production with relative equanimity. It recognizes the 
importance of meaningful work and acknowledges the way in which classi- 
cal liberalism became an apologia for man's inhumanity to man. In so doing 
it seems to avoid the semantical and ideological extremes of socialism as 
well as laissez faire, rejecting the view that inequality means a lack of 
liberty on the left hand as well as the view that it is equality which has this 
consequence on the right. But this apparent advantage also obscures impor- 
tant problems. So moderate a course presupposes the possibility of grafting 
welfare onto liberty in a way that avoids both a dogmatic preference for 
equality and the outright contradictions which socialists find in individual- 
istic philosophies.2 It is by no means clear how egalitarian tendencies can be 
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 
50-51. 
2. For such charges of dogmatism, see Robert Nisbet, "The Pursuit of Equality," Public 
Interest, no. 35 (1974), pp. 103-20; and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1974), chaps. 7 and 8. Note that the holist account described below counts against any 
individualist theory-whether liberal (like Rawls's) or libertarian (like Nozick's). 
This content downloaded from 134.153.186.189 on Tue, 28 May 2013 07:28:15 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
4 Ethics 
justified unless distributive considerations form a constitutive part of liber- 
ty. Such perennial unclarities can hardly be resolved without an adequate 
assessment of the merits of individualist and holist models of mankind. In 
the past, debate confined to vague distinctions has necessarily proven inde- 
cisive, but Rawls's characterization of theories of justice suggests a more 
manageable treatment of the dispute. Are moral sentiments, and human 
attitudes generally, better understood in terms of individual psychology or 
in terms of social phenomena? The socialist view of human nature which is 
supported by the latter alternative is at least as plausible as its liberal 
competitor. A few additional contrasts prepare the way for development of 
the socialist view. 
When society is bifurcated into political and economic sectors a theory 
of justice needs principles to describe both, and anyone who rejects the 
bifurcation will easily find evidence in support of his assumption that such 
principles must be inadequate. The liberal welfare state seems never to 
provide sufficient benefits to remedy the disadvantages they are meant to 
correct, and the problem is most readily explained by reference to the 
incoherence of the liberal conception. C. B. Macpherson argues that the two 
principles which define Rawls's conception of justice are incapable of being 
satisfied together. Since concentrations of wealth are demonstrably detri- 
mental to equal liberty, no principle of liberty can be satisfied unless there 
are economic transfers from the wealthy to the poor. But a principle of 
distributive justice stating that economic inequalities must benefit the least 
advantaged requires a limit to these transfers: Inequalities have these bene- 
fits only because the incentives they provide increase social productivity to 
an extent advantageous to all, and damage to incentives may work against 
everyone. These requirements seem inconsistent because no limit on trans- 
fers compatible with the second principle could be high enough to prevent 
accumulations of wealth detrimental to liberty. Since any such accumulation 
restricts liberty, any limits on transfers will have this result.3 
This argument overlooks important structural properties of Rawls's 
theory, and it is uncompelling in any case. Even granted that concentrations 
of wealth endanger equal liberty, it is difficult to maintain that moderate 
accumulations of wealth actually restrict liberty unless it is also shown that 
their social effects can be understood in terms of oppression, exploitation, 
discrimination, and like grounds for resentment. Where there is oppression 
liberty is evidently infringed, but only in this case are inequalities clearly 
inequitable. So long as the poor become better off in absolute terms as the 
rich get relatively richer it may be very difficult to identify any damage to 
freedom. A Marxist social scientist might, to be sure, use class inequalities 
as criteria of hidden exploitation, but he would thereby forfeit any claim to 
have scientific evidence in support of his claim. In so doing, as in resorting 
uncritically to "false Consciousness," he would divorce oppression and ex- 
ploitation from what men actually feel and thus sever the desirability of 
3. C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 93. 
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liberty from any account of human attitudes which might explain its value. 
Where one group of men is in servitude to another the fact must be 
discernible by all sides and not only by those who share the insight of a 
particular social theory. 
In the absence of manifest exploitation Rawls can deal easily with 
Macpherson's charge: "The inability to take advantage of one's rights and 
opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means 
generally, is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty. 
I shall not however say this, but rather I shall think of these things as 
affecting the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of the rights that the 
first principle defines."4 Of course, this is not simply a convenient way of 
speaking. It bares the liberal heart of Rawls's theory. Nevertheless, so long 
as such a distinction can be maintained, no strong connections between 
wealth and liberty will be demonstrable. If poverty, ignorance, and other 
lacks were counted as limitations on freedom itself, then the demand for 
equal liberty would include a demand for all feasible equality in the distri- 
bution of other social goods. If social and economic disadvantages were 
considered to decrease liberty itself rather than the value of rights which 
constitute liberty, then there would be no sense in talking of first maximiz- 
ing equal liberty and then applying principles of distribution. In this case 
there could indeed be an antagonism between principles of the sort es- 
poused by egalitarian liberals, since any inequalities permitted by principles 
of distribution would be prohibited by the principle of liberty. If liberty 
were identified with its worth, moreover, a principle of liberty would make 
essential reference to the social goods subject to distribution, and there 
would be no clear distinction between parts of the social system governed, 
repectively, by principles of liberty and of distribution. The conception of 
justice defined by such principles would be a socialist rather than liberal 
one. 
The liberal conception is secure so long as inequalities are not experi- 
enced as unjust constraints, or so long as they would not be so experienced 
if all the relevant facts were known. Liberal theory, furthermore, commands 
a powerful argument for saying that differences should be regarded as the 
very opposite of constraints, hence for retaining a separate principle of 
distribution. Such a principle is warranted not merely by the contribution 
which differences make to the material welfare of the poor but also by the 
contribution they make to the value of liberty for everyone. Given the 
relationship between economic goods and the ability to make use of one's 
freedoms, the value of liberty is greatest in a society in which inequalities 
make everyone materially better off. Since each person's effective liberty as 
well as standard of living is enhanced by such an arrangement, any other 
organization would be evidently irrational. 
There is a temptation to brand appeal to the advantages of inequality as 
disingenuous. A just society is one whose members are governed by a sense 
4. Rawls, p. 204. 
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of justice. It is, therefore, one in which persons desire to act from the 
principles of justice which define this sense including the principle, in 
Rawls's view, that inequalities work to the benefit of those who have the 
least. But surely, we are inclined to argue, to desire that inequalities have 
this result is to desire to benefit the least advantaged, and this desire is best 
satisfied by agreeing to an equal distribution. One who insists upon his 
personal advantages rather than striving for the socialist ideal, consequent- 
ly, cannot be just. However, the inclination to argue in this way rests upon 
a confusion. The principle of distribution entitles one to certain advantages 
on condition that the arrangement work to the benefit of others. To desire 
to abide by the principle is thus to desire to abide by such arrangements; it 
is not necessarily to desire to benefit anyone else. The principle of just 
distribution only places certain conditions upon entitlements; it does not 
require philanthropy. Any plausible theory of justice must assume a limit 
on the strength of social and altruistic motivation and suppose that, while 
individuals are prepared to act justly, they are not prepared to abandon their 
interests.5 Hence a liberal conception need neither be mendacious nor col- 
lapse into the socialist one. 
Liberalism cannot be convicted of disguised selfishness, but neither can 
socialism be charged with unrealistic selflessness. No socialist need retreat 
before the criterion of plausibility just stated, for he envisages a revolution 
of social circumstances such that the incentive argument has no application 
and no interests of any needy group are benefited by differences of wealth. 
Given a conception of work as inherently rather than instrumentally desir- 
able activity, justice will be realized only when not merely wage slavery but 
also unsatisfying work has been abolished. Until this has happened, as 
critics of the liberal welfare state well recognize, one may have more reason 
to avoid work than to do it. So that some will not take advantage of the 
rest, work must be in everyone's interest; and the quality of work must 
provide sufficient incentive to make a contribution. There is no suggestion 
here that anyone is prepared to abandon his interests and no conflict with 
any known fact of human psychology. Nor, to this point, is there any 
conflict of political philosophies. To the extent that liberalism and social- 
ism are content to describe quite different social circumstances there is no 
real contest between them. There is only a dispute about the use of the 
word "justice." For the socialist, liberalism portrays a not-yet-just society; 
for the liberal, socialism depicts a society beyond justice since the dominant 
motivations there obviate problems of distribution. Yet there remains a 
difference in ideals. It arises from disagreement about the nature of liberty, 
the nature of work, the nature of rationality, and about human nature and 
psychology. The depth of these differences suggests that they can be ade- 
quately elucidated only with the help of logical analysis, and it is here that 
contrasting theories about attitudes provide illumination. A political theory 
5. Ibid., p. 281. 
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needs the backing of a theory of attitudes which explicates the logical status 
of such central notions as equity and exploitation, and the adequacy of the 
one theory depends upon that of the other. By understanding the structure 
of competing views of human attitudes we are better able to assess the 
political ideals they support. 
II. MORAL ATTITUDES: SOME ANALYSES 
Liberalism is characteristic of both utilitarian and contractarian theo- 
ries. In spite of their important differences they share a general conception 
of attitudes which socialists implicitly reject. Bentham regarded attitudes 
and emotions as structureless feelings, and later utilitarians were not able to 
correct him. All attitudes, he insisted, are pleasures and pains caused by 
certain perceptions. The pains of the moral sanction, or ill name, for exam- 
ple, are those accompanying recognition that others regard one with aver- 
sion. Pains are all alike, but they are differently called according to their 
different causes or associations.6 Of course, this is absurd. We have differ- 
ent feelings under different circumstances and do not simply call the same 
feeling by different names. Rawls quite rightly regards many of our atti- 
tudes as having a definite internal structure in terms of which differences 
among feelings can be explained. Moral emotions, such as guilt and indig- 
nation, are, on his view, defined by principles of right and can be identified 
in terms of these constitutive principles. They are feelings which can be 
experienced only by persons who accept such principles and thus have an 
internal or intellectual structure which Bentham did not acknowledge. The 
essential similarity between the two views is that in neither are attitudes to 
be likened to assertions. Even for Rawls they are noncognitive in having 
their basis in principles which are chosen rather than in beliefs which are 
subject to tests of truth and falsity. We are subject to diverse emotions 
when we have adopted various principles, but these emotions are not sub- 
ject to verification in the manner of factual beliefs. A choice of such 
principles need not be arbitrary or idiosyncratic, since it may be made in the 
light of basic human wants and needs: given knowledge of such facts, 
certain principles are rational and others are not. Even rational principles, 
however, are expressions of individual decision rather than statements of 
testable belief. 
Bentham and his followers did not acknowledge the intellectual struc- 
ture of attitudes because no consistent utilitarian could do so. The concep- 
tion of attitudes as featureless is vital for the defense of the principle of 
utility as the sole principle of value. Utilitarianism is inconsistent with 
there being attitudes constituted by diverse principles which define a mul- 
tiplicity of ends rather than some single goal of utility. If, as utilitarianism 
no doubt correctly supposes, value is a function of feeling or attitude, then 
6. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1948), p. 161. 
This content downloaded from 134.153.186.189 on Tue, 28 May 2013 07:28:15 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8 Ethics 
if various feelings are defined by logically independent principles there is 
no basic feeling common to them all which can be identified as the sole 
arbiter of value. The intellectual structure of attitudes admits a variety of 
justifications for attitudes and makes possible a number of distinct inherent 
goods. Safety is a good for persons who feel fear, since fear includes a 
notion of danger and the desire to escape it. Likewise, giving comfort and 
making recompense is part of the good of anyone who feels pity and guilt, 
respectively. And such attitudes are adequately justified when one is in 
danger, when someone suffers excessively, or when principles of right have 
been violated. The contractarian rejection of utilitarianism rests upon a 
logical analysis of attitudes one which is obviously superior to the crude 
teleology of hedonism or to any other theory that purports to identify a 
single ground of choice. It explains how there can be value in justice which 
is not simply the value of means to some other end. 
Rawls's analysis of moral attitudes has two parts. It identifies their 
structured character, and it interprets this structure in terms of personal 
principles. The second part of this analysis is controversial, though, in fact, 
no consistent contractarian could take seriously the alternative possibility 
that attitudes are constituted by testable beliefs. In defending this thesis it 
is useful to note how the role of principles in liberal philosophical psychol- 
ogy explains an otherwise mysterious feature of Rawls's contractualism: the 
need to place one's attitudes and ideals behind a veil of ignorance.7 Contrac- 
tors must be denied knowledge of these facts about themselves, else they 
would fail to be rational. The structure of moral attitudes subjects them to 
conditions of rationality which would be violated were genuine contractors 
to know their feelings. Resentment, for example, is rational on the contrac- 
tarian view only when the principles of justice definitive of the attitude are 
apparently violated. This means that if one is still deliberating about what 
principles of justice to accept he could not rationally feel resentment, since 
he would have no way of determining that any given behavior was contrary 
to an acceptable conception of justice. Rational resentment is impossible 
before a conception of justice is arrived at, and since the contract situation 
is one in which persons reach such a conception, resentment and other 
moral emotions must initially be excluded. Moral attitudes need justifica- 
tion and rational men will not have them otherwise; but justification re- 
quires moral conceptions already on hand. Hence no view which admitted 
rational attitudes in the beginning could provide a contractarian account of 
justice. 
The need to exclude moral attitudes from one's initial deliberations 
does not obviously extend to other structured attitudes. Fear and pity are 
more naturally characterized in terms of certain conceptions or points of 
7. See Brian Barry, The Liberal Theoty of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 15, for 
one expression of such bafflement: "[W]hat is to stop us accepting that the 'circumstances of justice' 
are what Rawls says they are, and then putting into the original position human beings with their 
actual moral notions?" 
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view than in terms of principles: we conceive ourselves as in danger or see 
another person as suffering. Nevertheless, we do tend to assess such emo- 
tions in terms of shared conceptions of danger, suffering, and the like, and, 
insofar as other modes of assessment are lacking, the rationality of natural 
attitudes can be determined only outside of the deliberations characteristic 
of a social contract. Hence (subject to a later qualification) fear, pity, and 
envy, no less than guilt, resentment, and indignation, must be denied a 
place in the original considerations of isolated rational beings. 
Two characteristic features of liberal individualism (as opposed to utili- 
tarian liberalism) are evident in this result. First, the rationality of attitudes 
is evidently not that of actions. The structure of attitudes gives them tests 
of rationality which are not those of instrumental reason. The rationality of 
guilt and fear is not determined by the way in which these attitudes pro- 
mote other ends but by the appropriateness of the principles or conceptions 
which define them. Nevertheless, because questions of the rationality of 
attitudes are excluded from the contract situation, that is a situation in 
which only instrumental reason operates. Persons are pure strategists there, 
and they invite parody as narrow economic animals. Second, persons so 
portrayed are abstract individuals and lack significant relationships with 
others. By implication, only persons capable of forming rational attitudes as 
well as rational strategies are social beings, and only social beings are 
capable of forming rational attitudes. It is a virtue of Rawls's account, as of 
Rousseau's, that it recognizes these facts quite clearly. The facts are essen- 
tial for explaining the value of community and for rejecting the socialist 
parody of liberal man. By expressing one's arrival at principles constitutive 
of moral attitudes in terms of agreement, contractualism expresses the fact 
that these attitudes must be denied to rational individuals abstracted from 
society; but in establishing its individualism in this way it also establishes 
the conditions of inherently valuable social relationships. 
The individualist account is badly flawed, however, by being unable to 
sustain the distinction between instrumental and emotional reasoners. Indi- 
vidualists typically, though not explicitly, introduce one significant qualifi- 
cation to the instrumental conception of initial rationality. Even if abstract 
individuals are not resentful or compassionate they are always regarded as 
prudent. Yet prudence is no less a structured attitude than any moral emo- 
tion. It is not identical with instrumental reason, since it incorporates a 
conception of persons which the latter does not. Whereas instrumental 
reason aims at the satisfaction of whatever interests one happens to have, 
prudence identifies certain interests as one's own. Prudence includes the 
principle that one be provident; it includes a conception of oneself as a 
being with integrity through time and in so doing identifies one's future 
interests as worth promoting in the present. The price of not doing so is 
irrationality, since failure to take such steps constitutes a failure to adopt 
the means to ends which any prudent person has. Rational persons, if they 
are prudent, formulate a plan of life and follow it. It is noteworthy, howev- 
er, that this statement is a conditional one a person who lacked a concep- 
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tion of himself as having integrity through time and who adopted no 
principle of providence would be under no obligation of reason to care for 
the future-and it may be wondered if the condition can be satisfied in a 
contract situation which excludes other structured attitudes. 
Of course, our self-conceptions are in fact largely determined by our 
social environment. Our concern for the future is strong in proportion to 
our expectations about influencing it or being able to influence it, and the 
extent of our prudence and sense of self is closely tied to the exigencies of 
income and opportunity which determine this ability.8 In fact, therefore, 
the prudence accorded to rational contractors is the expression of social 
conditions in which the distribution of income and opportunity is already 
extensive. The demands of reason cannot be specified in terms of a self- 
interest identifiable independently of such conditions, since self-conceptions 
are inseparable from the prudence occasioned by actual circumstances. Nor, 
it would seem obvious, can conceptions of justice be specified indepen- 
dently of existing conditions. If prudence and self-conceptions are governed 
by social facts, so too should moral attitudes and conceptions of other 
persons be governed by such facts. Principles essential to guilt and resent- 
ment will always express actual relationships among persons, and it seems 
clear, therefore, that there is no particular set of principles which any man 
both rational and moral can be expected to acknowledge. 
It would be natural to reply that such facts are beside the logical point: 
To note that attitudes and their constitutive principles are constrained by 
social circumstances is not to show such factors to be relevant to the 
appropriateness of attitudes and emotions. On the contrary, the reply con- 
tinues, we must abstract from the transitory contingencies which shape and 
prejudice our attitudes in order to formulate justifiable principles. But this 
reply will not do, for there is no alternative to assessment in terms of 
contingencies. If prudence is defined by a principle of providence or a 
particular sort of self-conception, the conception is a metaphysical one. 
That is, neither empirical fact nor instrumental reason requires it. There is 
nothing necessarily mistaken or irrational about a person who is satisfied to 
live only for the moment, and it is rational to abide by a principle of 
providence and to, formulate a life plan only if one sees oneself in the 
manner characteristic of prudence. There is no independent rationale. The 
self-conception needs the support of the attitude as much as that conception 
is essential to prudence, and possession of that attitude depends on there 
being conditions favorable to it. 
Before developing the holist analysis of attitudes suggested by these 
observations, one other liberal departure from the individualist account 
ought to be mentioned. When liberty is conceived of as something good in 
8. See Edward C. Banfield, who links an "attenuated sense of self," a conception of the future 
as "something fixed, fated, beyond [one's] control," and lack of "opportunities to rise by effort and 
enterprise." Enhanced conceptions tend "to follow increases in income and opportunity" (The Un- 
heavenly City [Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970], pp. 53-58). 
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its own right rather than simply as something valuable for the realization 
of other ends, then we must be ascribed a tendency to make good use of it. 
If our aims and interests were generally low and banal we would lack 
concern for self-esteem and dignity, and the desire for the liberty which 
allows us self-expression and development would lack an intelligible place 
in our lives. Any theory which ascribes inherent value to liberty thus incor- 
porates a distinction between higher and lower pursuits and with it a con- 
ception of value which is not defined simply in terms of what we happen 
to want and the best means to get what we want. There is, of course, a 
tendency among liberals to deny this, since it is difficult to reconcile with 
the idea of man as first of all a strategist; and both the idea and its denial 
find expression in Rawls's "Aristotelian Principle" which says that, as a 
matter of fact, human beings desire more complex activities to simpler 
ones. But this principle does not state a matter of brute psychological fact. 
It has a rational explanation which is damaging both to those who doubt its 
truth and to Rawls's own account. 
One salient fact about our psychological constitution is the capacity for 
interest as well as interests. Interest is another structured attitude, and it is 
typically evoked by things found to be complex, varied, novel. To be 
interested in something is, for instance, to find it novel. In addition interest 
includes a desire to deal with its object, to come to know it, and as we come 
to know a thing its initial novelty wears away; it may no longer seem 
complex to us. If our capacity for interest is still to find an outlet, and if we 
are to be spared from boredom and monotony, the attitude must find new 
objects novel ones or novel aspects of old objects. As it does so we 
ascend a chain of increasing complexity for quite clearly comprehensible 
reasons. As we advance, our judgments about novelty develop in accor- 
dance with the knowledge and experience we gain. Our structured interests 
thus depend essentially upon our history, as does the justification of these 
interests. Those things are worthy of our interest which are novel in our 
experience, complex given our acquired capacities, and the like. Reason bids 
us attend to those things which are properly interesting to us, given the 
state of our education. This is not, of course, instrumental reason, for it 
tells us not how to satisfy our attitude but what it is rational to have that 
attitude toward. 
Some desires we simply have, others are integral to structured attitudes. 
The latter desires are not brute wants which assail us but depend intimately 
upon the process of development which has made us the persons we are. 
The Aristotelian Principle is thus rationally explicable in a way which 
makes the notion of ahistorical rational individuals patently absurd. Now it 
does not follow from this alone that the notion of an acultural rational 
individual is an equal absurdity. To speak of a person is to speak of an 
individual-with-a-history, but liberal philosophers may insist that it is not 
obviously to speak of an individual-in-society. One can intelligibly maintain 
that the only proper standard of rational interest (or any other structured 
attitude) must be expressed entirely in terms of an individual's own experi- 
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ence. On such a view, those things which we acknowledge to be interesting 
are so in virtue of their being interesting to each individual. There is no 
standard of interestingness independent of particular persons. Likewise, 
even if fear and pity are assessed according to shared conceptions of danger 
and suffering, these conceptions are finally to be explained in terms of 
similarities of personal experience, aversions, and sympathies. The basic 
standard, on such a view, is that of the individual. The exclusion of natural 
attitudes from a contract situation may thus be an expression of the devel- 
opment rather than the social character of the conceptions supporting these 
attitudes. 
While such an individualistic account of our attitudes can be consis- 
tently developed it is by no means indubitable. Our shared conceptions may 
be better understood than in terms of a coincidence of individual view- 
points. It is equally possible that those things which are interesting, fearful, 
and so on, are made so by social norms of experience and that the basic 
standard is a social one. The latter view is the one we would expect of a 
holist model of man and society, and it is the one appropriate to socialism. 
Whereas sophisticated individualists recognize that many attitudes pos- 
sess a formal structure which makes them subject to tests of rationality, 
socialists should suppose that such attitudes are fully cognitive and subject 
to tests of factual correctness. Liberal theory, we noted, understands the 
rational character of moral emotions in a manner consistent with individual 
autonomy by representing their structural elements as principles or concep- 
tions which resist verification in the manner of factual statements. So long 
as the principles consitutive of one's various attitudes are consistent with 
each other and with one's basic ends, they are regarded as justified. Ulti- 
mately, assent to such principles depends upon choice or agreement, so that 
attitudes on this view are understood in terms of individual decisions and 
contracts. Such a view is mistaken, however, if the structural elements of 
attitudes are properly construed as beliefs-as assertive states based upon 
experience and subject to confirmation by reference to an extraindividual 
standard. Thus, to a view of resentment on which the attitude is defined by 
principles of right there may be opposed the view that resentment includes 
the belief that some person or situation is unfair. If attitudes are genuinely 
cognitive states and subject to tests of correctness, then those attitudes are 
justified whose defining beliefs are expressed in demonstrably true proposi- 
tions. And if this is so then individual decision has no more place in 
questions of right than it has in questions about empirical fact. 
The crucial point in the analysis of attitudes appropriate to socialism is 
that the appropriateness of attitudes should rest upon correspondence with 
fact. The assessment of attitudes, hence an account of justice, should de- 
pend upon considerations which are in this sense objective. This is not to 
say, though, that the facts by which beliefs about fairness and unfairness 
are verified should be construed as straightforwardly empirical-that is, as 
facts of the sort which justify beliefs about colors, quantities, human pow- 
ers and frailties, and similarly discriminable phenomena. A theory which 
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represented attitudes as verifiable by reference to facts of this sort would be 
evidently naturalistic: it would say that certain dispassionately observable 
facts entail the correctness of certain attitudes-an evidently evaluative 
conclusion from factual antecedents. Such an analysis would, like a socialist 
one, be antiindividualistic, since it would restrict justifiable attitudes to 
those with objective support and thus preclude personal choice as a ground 
for any structured attitude. But in identifying grounds of justification in 
nature rather than society, such a theory would be antiholist as well. And it 
would almost certainly be incorrect. This judgment need not depend on 
the cumulative weight of seven decades' criticism of naturalistic theories. It 
is enough to note that, for the same reasons that the self-conceptions 
characteristic of prudence cannot be justified by evidence available to un- 
feeling observers, the notion of fairness characteristic of resentment lacks 
the basis in universally acknowledgeable fact possessed by concepts of col- 
ors and human powers. Such notions express points of view typical of a 
disposition to certain attitudes; they are not notions of things naively per- 
ceived. 
Points of view need not be regarded as logically unverifiable visions. 
They may be characteristic of a society and confirmable by reference to 
expectations prevailing in society. The alternative to justifying attitudinal 
beliefs in rational agreement or natural fact is their verification in social 
fact. Any argument for the correctness of this alternative will prove long 
and complicated, for there can be no easy refutation of well-entrenched and 
logically consistent individualist assumptions. A plausible holistic competi- 
tor of individualistic and naturalistic theories can, however, be stated in 
fairly short order. The main idea of a theory which supports a distinctively 
socialist sense of justice must be that the agreements characteristic of mem- 
bers of a society depend upon the character of each society rather than upon 
observation of broadly natural fact or upon considerations which would be 
persuasive to any rational calculator. The main problem of such a theory is 
showing that there can be a sound nonnatural and nonindividual basis for 
such agreement. While we say that someone's resentment is justified if we 
agree that he is a victim of unfairness, agreement is not a test of truth, and 
without a standard of correctness independent of social agreements the 
factual character of such judgments cannot be established. 
Such a standard will be found, if anywhere, in the common experiences 
of a society. Experience which we all share establishes a body of social 
norms and expectations by reference to which attitudes and the beliefs they 
contain can be justified. Evidently, we regard those persons as excellent and 
admirable who exceed the norm in certain respects; those persons excel who 
exceed our expectations. Similarly we consider piteous not everyone who 
suffers a pain but only those who suffer more than our experience teaches 
us must be borne by anyone. In general, we make such evaluations on the 
basis of expectations made reasonable by social experience. Those persons 
are unqualifiedly admirable or piteous whose superiority or suffering con- 
trasts with prevailing norms, and the independence of such norms from 
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particular individuals establishes the existence of a standard for testing 
judgments which makes those judgments factual. To put the point more 
modestly: such patterns of appraisal do represent our actual practice of 
evaluation, and the holist view suggests that a correct theory of evaluation 
is more likely to correspond than to conflict with this practice. We assess 
our attitudes less in terms of our own experience than in terms of the 
common experience of society. We will retract a claim of interestingness if 
we are shown that something novel in our limited experience is actually 
commonplace. Will an adequate theory of attitudes not reflect these actual 
patterns of evaluation? 
III. EQUITY AND EQUALITY 
The implications for justice of an affirmative answer are straightfor- 
ward. We regard those situations as fair which treat the interests of ev- 
eryone involved equitably, but the criterion of equitable treatment is not 
some set of principles which must prove acceptable to any rational person. 
The criterion is rather a certain correspondence to acquired expectations. If 
we expect those born with wealth to prosper while less fortunate persons 
remain poor we may well consider this just; the claims of property will be 
recognized. But if we expect to be able to exercise established liberties as 
fruitfully as any man we will consider leveling economic doctrines to accord 
with equitable treatment of each person's interests. This is not to say that 
if we expect to be cheated then cheating is fair. The expectations which 
count have a decidedly normative element; they are morally legitimate 
expectations. Such expectations, however, can hardly be separated from 
what we expect because it is normal-empirically legitimate expectations, 
expectations very like predictions. Under conditions in which we always 
expected attempts to cheat us we might well not regard cheating as we now 
do. Rather it might be a recognized feature of social interactions that 
persons took certain kinds of advantage of others wherever possible. Cheat- 
ing would be a kind of gamesmanship and not exploitative or unfair. It 
would constitute neither disrepect nor disregard for the interests of persons 
who willingly tolerated the arrangement. Of course, there are also cases in 
which some are helpless victims of cheating. One may belong to a group 
whose members can do nothing about it, who expect it and resent it. This 
is evident oppression, since one tolerates a situation not because it is fair 
but because one must. Inequalities of wealth and effective liberty may be 
similarly unfair and oppressive. In order to be so they need only fail to 
correspond to expectations which have been generated by the evident possi- 
bility of a more equal distribution of social goods and by the rhetoric of 
liberty and equality for all. 
Insofar as normative and normal expectations are inextricable and the 
latter are justified by existing social forms and practices, there is evidently 
a standard of justice independent of individual opinion. The belief-like 
states characteristic of resentment and related moral emotions may thus be 
capable of verification by reference to facts. They may, that is, be genuine 
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beliefs whose existence is incompatible with individualist conjectures about 
the basic reference point for evaluation. Even if a theory which identifies 
such facts is vindicated, to be sure, the holist victory over logical individu- 
alism could not by itself entail the need for organization on socialist princi- 
ples. Not only can the validity of a holist analysis of structured attitudes be 
consistent with collectivist aspects of a conservative defense of privilege; it 
can also be entirely consistent with the legitimacy of liberal principles of 
organization. Liberal institutions might satisfy everyone's expectations. 
If a socialist acknowledges the logical foundations of his political phi- 
losophy in a holist analysis of structured attitudes, then he must be pre- 
pared to regard as absurd the assertion that "the crucial problem today is 
that relatively few people view income inequality as a serious problem."9 If 
it is not viewed as a serious problem then one may reasonably be skeptical 
about the need to reorganize institutions along socialist lines. Given the 
relationship between modes of distribution and the expectations they justi- 
fy, one may reasonably presume that oppression and exploitation do not 
exist and thus that there is no serious injustice. The forces of production are 
not fettered by forms of social relations, and there is no class which has 
only its chains to lose. The reasonableness of such skepticism is not deci- 
sive, however. Socialism has always noted how perceptions may be obscured 
by obsolescent metaphysical theories10 and has aimed at raising the con- 
sciousness of an exploited majority to awareness of conditions which are 
not adequately appreciated. The aim is entirely consistent with the intimate 
relationship between prevailing attitudes and social realities which requires 
doubt about unperceived injustices. For it is the distinction between atti- 
tudes and the realities which justify them which gives the belief-like ele- 
ments of attitudes their factual status and makes sense of the notion of 
false consciousness. The distinction holds open the possibility that actual 
conditions do warrant resentment or indignation even if they do not evoke 
it, and when this is the case the socialists' task is an educational one. 
Education must be education to the facts, and here the holist analysis 
faces an inherent difficulty. Even the wealthy will grant the formal point 
that the inequalities of liberal society are contrary to liberty if they are 
oppressive, but they may be less prepared than members of other social 
strata to regard private property as an oppressive institution. Such charges 
cannot be substantiated solely by the resentment of the putatively oppressed 
or by the indignation of their champions, and if those accused are not 
conscious of any discrimination the charges will be rejected. Serious reform 
depends upon justifying resentment and indignation by reference to condi- 
9. See Christopher Jencks, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in 
America (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 263. 
10. Not only socialists, of course. Keynes, for example, urges, "Let us clear from the ground 
the metaphysical or general principles upon which, from time to time, laissez-faire has been founded" 
(The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 9, Essays in Persuasion [London: Macmillan Co., 
1972], p. 287). 
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tions which anyone would acknowledge to be unfair. But the holist analysis 
suggests that there may be circumstances in which there is no possibility of 
any such acknowledgment. To the extent that societies are bifurcated along 
class lines the experiences and expectations of each class may be so differ- 
ent that neither could see any justifiability in the claims of the other. This 
possibility represents a revolutionary situation, not any recognition of social 
facts; and it is avoided not by education but by rising wages, improved 
working conditions, profit sharing, progressive taxation, and a general blur- 
ring of class distinctions. The result may be a common standard by which 
a liberal society can justify its inequalities of wealth and satisfaction. 
But such concessions to liberalism should not be allowed to obscure 
the basic weakness of liberal theory which-if socialism is correct-ex- 
plains its egalitarian drift. If the collectivist account of attitudes is right, 
then liberty is not easily abstracted from questions of distribution. The 
semantical oddity of identifying liberty and equality exists only so long as 
freedom is wrongly regarded as a condition identifiable independently of 
attitudes taken toward it. Liberty is not a neutral concept. It is, as its 
etymology indicates, a concept inseparable from human attitudes and rela- 
tionships. We are free when others respect our interests and tolerate our 
actions, hence when we can be confident of our ability to act and have no 
reason to be selfish or small spirited. Liberty is related to such attitudes as 
respect, tolerance, confidence, and liberality in the same way that self- 
conceptions are related to prudence, novelty to interest, and danger and 
fairness to fear and guilt." As such, liberty is not a state which can be 
understood apart from complicated expectations about possibilities for ac- 
tion and interaction. Insofar as such possibilities rest upon the means neces- 
sary to action, the expectations in question evidently include whatever 
broadly economic considerations are important to success. Questions of 
liberty cannot, therefore, plausibly be separated from questions concerning 
institutions of distribution. And a society which places great value upon 
liberty will not be able consistently to countenance the inequalities of 
liberty entailed by discrepancies of means. Given a state of affairs in which 
the material conditions of meaningful action depend upon economic incen- 
tives to work, such inequalities may be inescapable, but that only shows 
that such incentives need replacement by work which enhances self-esteem 
and satisfaction. 
For a view which stresses the essentially social character of liberty, 
agreements and contracts have an important but decidedly secondary place. 
They cannot provide the foundation of social life, for social institutions are 
not adequately justified by agreements among self-interested persons, no 
matter how impartial. Such agreements would be irrational in that sense of 
reason which concerns our essentially social nature. Instrumental reason 
11. For further discussion of such relationships, see Evan Simpson, "Aesthetic Appraisal," 
Philosophy 50 (April 1975): 189-204. 
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provides adequate grounds for individual choice only in the limited area in 
which the ends it advances are not assessable by reference to social fact. 
When ends are set by structured attitudes, strategies for their satisfaction 
are in order only to the extent the ends are justified. Since it is in terms of 
such attitudes that the notions of freedom and equity are actually under- 
stood, rational agreements about institutions cannot be made except from 
within a social context. Liberty and welfare, politics and economics, are so 
bound together that the question of liberty is also a question of equality. If 
one believes that liberty is essential for justice the only tenable view in a 
diverse and changing society-one should recognize that justice means real 
equality. Only if one is not much concerned for the greatest possible equal 
liberty can justice and equality be separated. 
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